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Lien-Suiiilies- Work Done.-When supplies are furnished to a
vessel in a foreign port by order of her master a lien is implied, but for
work by 6rder of the owner no lien will be held to exist unless proved by
the agreement of the parties.
MARITIME LIEN FOR REPAIRS AND SUPPLIES TO A SHIP.
When, in the early stages of the
development of our system of mari-
time law, the question of the ex-
istence of a maritime lien for
necessary repairs and supplies to a
ship, came before the courts for
consideration, they rejected the
English law, which held that no
such lien existed, on the ground
that the non-existence of such a
lien in England was due alone to
the lack of jurisdiction of the
courts of admiralty, by reason
of the prohibition of the courts of
common law. The Supreme Court
having previously decided that the
grant of admiralty and maritime
jurisdiction in the Constitution was
not a grant o f the limited jurisdic-
tion of the admiralty courts of
England, no similar objection to
the jurisdiction of the Federal
courts could be made, and it was
held, following the civil law, that
one who furnished necessary sup-
plies had a lien upon the ship itself
for his security, which could be en-
forced by an action in rem: "The
Aurora," I Wheat., 96. It cannot,
IReported in 50 Fed. Rep., 914.
however, be truly said that the
civil law was followed, as our courts
being influenced by the common
law repugnance to secret liens did
not adopt the broad principle of
the implied hypothec of the civil
law, but based the existence of the
maritime lien for supplies upon the
necessity for credit to the ship. As
a ship is constructed for action
rather than inaction, or as has been
said, that "a ship is made to plow
the seas and not to rot by the
walls," the courts were compelled
by the necessities of commerce and
trade to hold that where, in order
to prevent a defeat of that purpose,
credit to the ship was necessary,
that the law would imply that an
hypothecation had been made, i. e.,
that a maritime lien existed.
The theory of the courts that in
cases only of a necessity for credit
to the ship would a maritime lien
exist, greatly affected the subse-
quent development of the law, and
has created many points of differ-
ence from the civil law.
'The first point of difference ef-
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fected arose in "The Gen'l Smith,"
4 Wheat., 438 (18ig), where it was
held that if supplies were furnished
to a ship in the port or State to
which she belonged, that the mari-
time law would imply no lien, and
that nofie existed unless given by
the local municipal law. Under
these circumstances the owner be-
ing present, or presumptively pres-
sent, the presumption is that his
personal credit will suffice to obtain
supplies, and the law will not en-
courage secret liens by implying
one, but will recognize an express
lien by way of bottomry alone.
The tendency at first was to con-
fine these liens within the strictest
limits. Thus, in "The St. Jago dd
Cuba," 9 Wheat., 409 (18 24), JOHN-
SON, J., said, in delivering the
opinion of the Court: "It is not in
the power of anyone but the ship-
master, not the owner himself, to
give these implied liens upon the
vessel. The law marine attaches the
power of pledging or subjecting the
vessel to material men, to the office
of shipmaster. The necessities of
commerce require that when remote
from the owner he shall be able to
subject the owner's property to
that liability, without which it is
reasonable to believe he will not be
able to pursue his owner's interests.
When the owner is present the
reason ceases, and the contract is
inferred to be with the owner him-
self, on his own responsibility,
without a view to the vessel."
But the same necessities of coni-
merce which led the courts to
recognize these liens led to a
modification of the doctrine pro-
nounced in this dictum.
In Thomas v. Osborn, 19 How.,
22 at page 38, TANEY, C. J., says:
' Now, if Leach is to be regarded
as owner for the time when he was
sailing "The Laura" under the
agreement, then by the maritime
law the repairs and supplies fur-
nished at his request are presumed
to have been furnished upon his
personal credit, unless the contrary
afifears."
In 1869 the question came before
the Supreme Court in "The Kalo-
rama," io Wall., 204, and it was
then held that it was no objection
to the assertion in the admiralty of
a maritime lien against a vessel for
necessary repairs made and supplies
furnished to her in a foreign port
that the owner was there and gave
directions in person for them, the
same having been made expressly
on the credit of the vessel. In de-
livering the opinion of the Court,
CLIFFORD, J., said: "Implied liens,
it is said, can be create d only by the
master, but if it is meant by that
proposition that the owner or
owners, if more than one, cannot
order repairs and supplies on the
credit of the vessel, the Court can-
not assent to the proposition, as the
practice is constantly otherwise.
Undoubtedly, the presence of the
owner defeats the implied authority
of the master, but the presence of
the owner would not destroy such
credit as is necessary to furnish
food to the mariners and save the
vessel and cargo from the perils of
the sea."
In "The Guy," i Ben., 112; 9
Wall., 758, it was held that a mari-
time lien existed for supplies fur-
nished to the owner upon his order,
the Court finding that "there was
an agreement based upon the credit
of the vessel," and that "the re-
sponsibility of the boat for the *bill
was a feature in the transaction,
recognized by both parties at the
time of the contracting of the
debt."
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The rule, deducible from these
cases, is that where the owner is
present in a foreign port and sup-
plies are furnished to a ship,'that
the presumption is that they are
furnished upon his .personal credit,
but the presumption is not a con-
clusive one, and may be rebutted
by evidence that the personal credit
of the owner in the foreign port is
not sufficient to supply the wants
of the ship, and that the credit of
the latter is actually relied upon.
Notwithstanding these decisions,
however, the later cases are not
harmonious, owing to the use of
certain expressions by the Court in
"The Kalorama."
In Stevenson v. "The Francis," 21
Fed. Rep., 715 (1883), it was held
by BRowN, J. (S. D. of N. Y.), that
where a known owner obtaining
supplies on his personal order in a
foreign port, not being master ("The
Mary Bell," i Sawy., 135), that he
deals presumptively on his pen.onaf
credit only, and no lien will be im-
plied unless the libellant satisfies
the Court, from the negotiations or
circumstances, that there was a
common understanding to bind the
ship.
The Court said: "In a foreign
port when the o*ner is present and
procures the supplies in'person, not
being master, in the absence of any
express reference to the- ship as a
source of credit, the sanmie presump-
tion as to the owner's means and as
to his intention exists primafacie;
but this presumption is not conclu-
sive, as in the home port, and may
be repelled by proof drawn either
from the express language of the
parties or from any other circum-
stances satisfactorily showing that
a credit of the ship was within the
common intention, and when this
intention appears the lien will be
sustained. This is allowed because
even an owner in a foreign .port
may be without the means, reputa-
tion or credit, and hence maybe
under the same necessity as the
master for making use of the credit
of the ship. But as I have said, this
necessity in the case of the owner
is not presumed. It must appear in
proof, either from the circumstan-
ces or from the terms of the nego-
tiation, which may afford conclusive
evidence both of the iltent and of
the necessity. . . . In all the
reported decisions where a lien has
been sustained for supplies fur-
nished by an owner in person .in a
foreign port, the Court has found
an intent by both parties that the
ship should be charged, and has
placed the decision directly upon
that ground."
To the same effect are "The Union
Express," i Brown Adm., 537; "The
Sarah Harris," 7 Ben., 177; "The
Rapid Transit," ii Fed., 329. It is
questionable whether the dictum o
BROWN, J., in "The Frances," su-
fira, to the effect that to create a
maritime lien for supplies furnished
in a foreign port, that evidence of
both necessity of credit to the ship
and a common intent to burden the
ship is correct, in view of the rea-
son laid down for the existence of
such liens. Whether or not the
parties intend to hypothecate the
ship is immaterial, as no verbal
hypothecation is known to our law,
the only species known being by
express hypothecation in the nature
of bottomry, or the hypothecation
which the law implies where from
the circumstances the credit to the
ship is necessary. The intention
of the parties is immaterial. The
question is whether the situation of
the ship is such that the law will
infer that credit to her was neces-
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sary,which establishes the maritime
lien.
In "The Scotia," 35 Fed. Rep.,
907, BROWIF, J. reached a different
conclusion in reference to supplies
ordered by the master, holding that
the implied lien for supplies fur-
nished to a foreign vessel is created,
where it exists at all, by the mari-
time law, and not the master's will.
In "The Mary Morgan," 28 Fed.
Rep., x96, the Court seems to have
been of opinion that no impflied lien
exists for supplies furnished to the
owner in a foreign port, and that
only an express lien would be up-
held.
The Court said: "The notion of
extending it (implied liens) to debts
contracted to the owner is of recent
origin. The wisdom of so extend-
ing it is certainly open to grave
doubt. Why should it be thus ex-
tended? The owner being present
may authorize an express lien. He
is hampered by no question of au-
thority. If he is willing to hypoth-
ecate his vessel, he can agree to do
so. Such an agreement removes
all room for speculation and uncer-
tainty. If the creditor does not
require this, why allow him to set
up an implied hypothecation, a
pledge to be implied or not, as the
Court may understand and construe
the circumstances." Just what is
meant by an express lien is not
clear, as our law recognizes none
but in the nature of bottomry; but
that is evidently not the sense in
which it is here used, as referenceis
made to the finding of the Court in
"The Kalorama," supra, that the
supplies were furnished in that case
with the express understanding
that they were furnished upon the
credit of the ship, as being consist-
ent with the idea of an express lien.
If the Court meant an express hy-
pothecation of the vessel, the con-
clusion is certainly questionable, as
even-when there is an express ref-
erence to the ship as a source of
credit the lien is not an express one
but an implied one. The difficulty
seems to originate in the use of the
word "implied " in connection with
theseliens. By our law where credit
to the ship is necessary the law will
hold that there is a maritime lien,
i. e., will imfly that an hypotheca-
tion of the vessel has been made.
Under certain circumstances the law
will imply or infer that the credit
of the ship has been relied upon,
and consequently that there is an
implied lien.
In "The George ..-Kemp," 2 Low.,
477, it is held that there may be an
implied or maritime lien for sup-
plies furnished to the owner. To the
same effect see "Maritime Liens,"
by T. M. Etting, Esq., AMERICAN
LAW REZISnR, N. S., Vol. XXI,
85.
A logical conclusion from the de-
cisions of the Supreme Court would
seem to be that the existence of a
maritime lien in such cases depends
upon whether the circumstances
show a necessity of credit to the ship,
and that the intention of the parties
has no other effect than as a fact
showing that the personal credit of
the owner is not sufficient to supply
the necessities of the vessel.
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